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Abstract
In this paper we analyse the effects of ageing in a small open econ-
omy with a representative government. More specific, we adress the
question whether in case of ageing a transition from an unfunded to
a more funded pension scheme is politically feasible. We show that
the existence of a suitable subsidy on savings is crucial in this respect.
Without a subsidy on savings, the economy is trapped at the pre-
existing level of saving and ageing leads to an increase of the PAYG
tax. However, if a subsidy exists which is linked to the tax rate in a
non-linear way a conversion from PAYG to funded pensions is politi-
cally feasible.
JEL classification: J14, H55
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1 Introduction
In the year 2030 more than 30 percent of the total population in the OECD
countries will be over 60 years of age whereas in 1990 this was only 18 per-
cent.1 This ageing of the population will lead to higher costs in countries
with a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financed public pension scheme. As is well
known, the rate of return of such schemes deteriorates in case of ageing.
Some economists therefore advocate a complete (and fast) transition from
unfunded to funded public pension schemes.2 However, although such a
transition increases utility in the long run, it is not a Pareto improvement
as it harms at least one of the present generations.3 As a consequence of
this, the change from a PAYG-scheme to a capital reserve system may well
be politically unfeasible. That is, it may not be implemented by politicians
in a representative democracy who are accountable only to the current gen-
erations.
For a transition from unfunded to funded social security to be politically
feasible, PAYG-taxes should initially be decreased only slightly in order not
to harm the current old too much. At the same time, the current young
should be encouraged to save more as this enables future governments to
decrease PAYG-taxes. It may therefore be expected that the existence of
a suitable subsidy on savings has important consequences for the political
feasibility of a conversion of the method of financing of pensions. In this
paper we analyse how politicians in a small open economy with a PAYG-
scheme react to ageing under different subsidy schemes.
The model we use is a two-overlapping-generations (OLG) model with a
representative government which for its political support depends on both
the current young and the current old.4 The government is formed by a
sequence of drafts of politicians optimizing every period anew a weighted
sum of lifetime utility of the living young and old. At any point in time the
government decides on the level of the PAYG-tax rate.5 Apart from this, the
1See e.g. The Economist, 1996.
2See e.g. Feldstein (1996)
3Moreover, it is not possible to turn it into a Pareto improvement by transferring wealth
from future generations to present generations through debt policy (see Verbon (1988) or
Breyer (1989)). We assume here that the elderly will bear the cost of the transition.
4For an overview of decision making in a representative democracy we refer to Gärtner
(1994) and Verbon (1993).
5Notice that we restrict ourselves to balanced budget policies. Allowing for govern-
ment debt as an additional instrument would make the analysis untractable. Moreover, in
many countries like e.g. the EMU-countries, debt policy is constrained by exogenous insti-
tutional restrictions. For an analysis of decision making on public debt in a representative
democracy see Meijdam, van de Ven en Verbon (1996).
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government may promise the current young a subsidy on their savings when
old which depends on the actual level of the PAYG-tax at that point in time.
However, by then a new generation of politicains will be in power. Therefore
such a promise has to be formalized in an institutional savings treatment
(IST).
Our analysis learns that the existence and the form of the IST is indeed
crucial for the political feasibility of a transition from unfunded to funded
pensions. Firstly, we show that in a small open economy without a subsidy
on savings ageing in the long run leads to a higher tax rate just as in a closed
economy.6 However, in this case, in contrast to a closed economy, savings will
neither rise nor fall. So, without a subsidy the small open economy is trapped
at the pre-existing level of savings and is not able to reduce the less efficient
PAYG-scheme and increase savings as advocated by Feldstein et al. Secondly,
we demonstrate that with a subsidy on savings which is linked to the tax rate,
ageing in the long run leads to higher savings and a lower PAYG-benefit than
before the decrease in population growth. Moreover, if the subsidy on savings
is related to the PAYG-tax rate in a non-linear fashion, we show that the
losses for the old are low enough to make a such a partial transition from
unfunded to funded pensions politically feasible. In particular, we prove
that for any set of parameters there exists a non-linear subsidy scheme such
that the value of the government’s target function (i.e. the weighted sum of
lifetime utility of the currently young and old) at the time of the decrease
in population growth as well as on all future points in time is higher than
without a subsidy on savings. This implies that if such a subsidy scheme
is institutionalized in the IST it will not be abolished in the face of ageing,
neither by the current government nor by future governments. Consequently,
there will be a partial transition from PAYG to funded pensions.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the well-known
two-period OLG framework for the private sector of the small open economy.
In section 3, we describe the target function an the instruments of the repre-
sentative government. The effects of domestic ageing under different subsidy
schemes are analysed in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
6See Meijdam and Verbon (1997) who analyse the consequences of ageing in a closed
economy. They show that ageing will in the long run lead to lower savings and higher
taxes to finance the PAYG-scheme. Notice that this is exactly opposite to what Feldstein
and others champion.
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2 The private sector
Consider a small open economy with a large number of identical individual
agents, who only differ in age. Each generation of agents lives for two periods,
and a new generation is born each period. For simplicity, labour supply is
assumed to be inelastic and normalized to one.7 A representative agent born





t ) + β log(c
o
t+1). (1)
In this equation cyt denotes consumption during youth of someone born on
date t and cot+1 denotes the consumption of the same individual while old in
period t+1. The parameter β indicates the private discount factor. For sim-
plicity we have assumed that the utility function is logarithmic, though none
of the main results that follow depends on this assumption.8 Furthermore
the agents are assumed not to be altruistic.
Let w denote wage income. A part τw of this income is taxed away by
the government to be transferred to the currently living old. The remaining
wage income is used for savings for old age (st) and for consumption, viz.,
cyt = (1− τ t)w − st.
When old, the agent consumes the return on his savings and the transfer
payment ∆ from the government which is given for the (atomistic) agent.
The consumption at time t + 1 of an old agent born on date t is given by
cot+1 = (1 + ξt+1 + r)st + ∆t+1 where r denotes the exogenous and constant
interest rate on the world capital market and ξ denotes the (possibly negative)
subsidy on savings. Maximizing lifetime utility function (1) subject to the
single-period budget constraints yields
cot+1 = (1 + ξt+1 + r)βc
y
t . (2)
Production is described by a standard constant-returns-to-scale produc-
tion function. The open economy is closed by the conventional equilibrium
conditions on the factor and good markets (see Appendix A).
7Allowing for endogenous labour supply considerably complicates the analysis, but
does not affect the main results. The reason for this is that the supply of labour can be
eliminated from the model using the first-order conditions. The dynamical system that
results in that case is equivalent to the one in case of exogenous labour supply. The
analysis for this case is available upon request from the authors.
8It would be sufficient for most of our results to assume that U(cyt , c
o
t+1) is homothetic






3 The representative government
In the economy described in the former section a representative government
is operating. Every period, this government is formed by a new draft of
politicians that is unrelated to past or future generations of politicians. These
politicians take account only of the interests of both the current young and
the current old. That is, the government maximizes the following function9
Wt = λβ log(c
o
t ) + (1 + nt)[log(c
y
t ) + β log(c
o
t+1)]. (3)
In (3) λ can be interpreted as a measure for the political power of an old
agent relative to a young one, which is determined exogenously, for example
through an implicit process of lobbying and/or rentseeking of different gener-
ations. Because we are interested in public pension schemes, we can restrict
λ to [0,∞) without loss of generality.
If we abstract from administrative costs, the (balanced) budget constraint
for the goverment at date t is given by
(1 + nt)τ tw = ∆t + ξtst−1, (4)
where nt stands for the rate of population growth at time t. Throughout the
paper it is assumed that the economy is dynamically efficient (r > nt, ∀t).
The government in period t determines the level of the tax rate τ t. We as-
sume that each generation of politicians adopts Nash behaviour towards the
private sector. Because the current and future tax rates are linked through
current savings, this assumption implies Nash behaviour towards future gov-
ernments. So, each period the current, forward-looking government decides
on the current tax rate, taking future tax rates as given. The optimal tax
rate in period t is follows from maximizing the target function (3) subject to




It follows directly from (2) and (5) that in the steady state ξ = λ− 1− r has
to hold.
As a benchmark, we start from the case where there is no subsidy scheme,
i.e. λ = 1 + r and ξt = 0 ∀t.
10 As alternative institutional settings, we
9Notice that this target function is a truncated version of a Benthamite social welfare
function. Bernheim (1989) calls this “the most natural class of welfare functions for a
representative government” (p.124).
10All results can be generalized to the case where the benchmark is a constant subsidy
ξt = λ− 1− r 6= 0 ∀t.
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analyse situations where the constitution contains an article that describes
the subsidy that will be paid to the old in period t as a function of the tax
rate τ t in that period:
ξt = ξ(τ t) = φ+ τ
m
t , m ≥ 1. (6)
In order to allow for a comparison of the different institutional settings we
start from identical steady states. That is, we assume that φ = −τm where
τ is the tax rate in the initial steady state. In case of an IST as described in
equation (6) the incentive for the young to save depends on the level of the
social security tax rate when old. As a consequence of this, the intertemporal
allocation of consumption varies over time with τ (see equation 2). As we will
show below, this allows for a partial transition from PAYG to a funded system
in case of ageing. However, at each point in time the government has the
possibility to abolish this IST and go back to the benchmark case without a
subsidy and it will do so if this increases the value of the government’s target
function. Of course, the present goverment is not able to commit the future
government that is formed by a new generation of politicians. Therefore, the
promise of a certain level of subsidy to the young through an IST is only
credible when future governments do not have an incentive to abolish this
IST.
4 The economic effects of ageing
This section deals with the economic effects of domestic ageing relative to
the rest of the world. Formally, ageing is interpreted as a once-and-for-all
decrease in the rate of population growth (n). Given some IST the long-run
consequences of changes in the rate of population growth are derived analyti-
cally by comparative statics. The short-run effects are traced by comparative
dynamics.11 The latter analysis is based on the linearization of the model
around the steady state.
Let nt = n+πht, where ht describes the time pattern of a peturbation of
the steady state value of the rate of population growth and π is a measure for
the magnitude. It is assumed that at some time t = 0 ageing unexpectedly
occurs, i.e., h0 = h1 = · · · = h < 0. The linearized model can then be
condensed to a system describing the changes in the level of private savings
(st) and in the social security tax rate (τ t) for a given level of m (and thus
of φ).
11The method of comparative dynamics was first introduced by Judd (1982) for a
continuous-time model. It can easily be transformed to discrete time, however. The


















 , t = 0, 1, . . . (7)
where J is the Jacobian matrix and Q is a matrix describing the effects
of the current and next-period change in the rate of population growth. This
system can be used to describe the evolution of savings and the PAYG-tax
in reaction to ageing given the predetermined level of savings of the old in
period t = 0.12
In order to learn the effects of the IST, given by (6), we first describe
the reactions of the representative government and the private sector for
the case where a subsidy on savings exists. Then we derive what happens
if there is no subsidy. Finally we analyse the question whether a partial
transition from unfunded to funded pensions is politically feasible. For a
detailed exposition of the algebra underlying the following graphical analysis
the reader is referred to Appendix B.
Subsidy
The effects of an unexpected decrease in the rate of population growth with










Figure 1: Effects of ageing with a subsidy on savings.
Initially, ageing leads to a jump in the tax rate from the origin to the
intersection of the stable manifold of the system (which is displayed by the
dotted line in Figure 1) and the ∂τ
∂π
-axis (this jump is described by (B.6) in
part B of the Appendix). That is, the representative government initially
reacts to the unexpected decrease in n by an enlargement of the PAYG-
scheme to partly compensate the currently living old. This increase in the
tax rate has a negative effect on savings by the current young. In spite of
this savings increase, however. This is partly due to the fact that the PAYG
benefit for the current young will be lower as the increase in τ 1 is not large
enough to offset the increase in the dependency ratio. The increase in savings
is, however, also partly caused by the higher subsidy on savings which results
from the increase in the future tax rate. In the following periods the tax rate
and savings evolve along the stable manifold until a new steady state (at
the intersection of the stable manifold with the ∂s
∂π
-axis) is reached. During
this adjustment process the PAYG-tax rate gradually decreases to its original
level before the shock and savings gradually increase. Note that the rise in
savings is tempered by the fact that the subsidy on savings falls over time
because of the fact that, after the initial upward jump, the PAYG-tax rate
is gradually brought down to its old level. Note further that the adjustment
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path implies that the initially enlarged PAYG scheme is gradually and partly
replaced by a capital reserve system where old-age consumption is to a larger
degree financed out of private savings. The long-run effect on the level of






Without a subsidy on savings the economy appears to be trapped at its
attained level of savings before ageing. To understand why the level of pri-
vate savings will not change, consider what would happen if the government
changed the intergenerational relation between young age consumption cyt
and old age consumption cot by choosing an appropriate social security tax








given by first-order-condition of the private sector remains
unaltered. So, the (relatively) lower young-age consumption leads to a lower
old-age consumption cot+2. The next government (in period t+ 1) will then





favouring the old-aged indi-
viduals at time t+2. Continuing this reasoning we get the following imploding




t+2 > . . . . It follows directly that
this consumption path is infeasible because it bankrupts the private sector at
some moment in time. Therefore, the only possible consumption paths are
those which do not alter the intergenerational link between currently living





, t = 0, 1, . . . .
As we will explain below, the government reacts to ageing in this case by







Figure 2: Effects of ageing without a subsidy on savings.
Figure 2 is a flinched version of Figure 1. In Figure 1 the stable manifold
and the two phaselines belonging to the state variables are all three distin-
guishable and only intersect in the new steady state. Here the phaselines
are given by the same equations and no saddlepoint dynamics exist. There
is an infinite number of steady states and the steady state that is actually
attained after the shock is completely determined by the level of savings of
the old living at the time of the shock. So the change in the level of private
savings due to an unexpected decrease in n is equal to zero in the short run
as well as in the long run. Consequently, it is smaller than the initial change











= 0, ∀t ≥ 0
Given this savings trap the government reacts to ageing by an increase in the
tax rate which is displayed in Figure 2 by the intersection of the phaselines
with the ∂τ
∂π
-axis. Any other intial jump in the tax rate would lead to implo-
sive or explosive timepaths of consumption.13 Notice that without a subsidy,
13This is due to the fact that with an infinite value for m, the stable manifold coincides
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ageing leads to a rise of the PAYG tax rate, while the long-run effect on the
tax rate equals the short-run effect. This short-run effect is larger than in












Political feasibility of transition
What we have learned by now is that with a subsidy government policy
results in a partial replacement of the intergenerational transfer system by
an intertemporal transfer system (private savings) which promises a higher
rate of return. This immediately implies higher steady-state lifetime utility
with a savings subsidy than without a subsidy. This, however, does not mean
that such a policy is politically feasible. Cases may exist where abolishing the
subsidy increases the political target function of the government. This should
be clear given the fact that the transition process harms the currently living
old at the moment of occurrence of the shock relative to a situation without
a subsidy. So, with a representative government consisting of politicians
only under the influence of currently living generations, such a transition is
politically feasible if the harm to the elderly is (more than) compensated by
the gain from this policy for the currently living young. From our numerical
computations14 it appears that is only the case if m >> 1. In that case the
government initially reacts to ageing through an increase in the tax rate that
is almost equal to the increase under the treatment with a fixed subsidy. So
the consumption of the currently living old almost equals the level in case
no subsidy exists. With a subsidy the increase in the tax rate also enhances
the incentive to save of the currently living young, but this enhancement is
muffled down by the choice of m >> 1. The initial increase in the tax rate
as well as the higher savings rate decrease current young age consumption.
This is compensated, however, by a higher old age consumption for them as
a result of the increased savings which outweigh the decrease in the tax rate
in the next period.
















Figure 3: Effect of m on the governmental target function.
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of the parameter m on the governmental
target function. On the horizontal axis the change in saving in reaction to
ageing is given while on the vertical axis the effect on the objective function
of the government as compared to the effect in case no subsidy exists is
represented. We distinguish two cases. First, if m = 1 the initial loss in
political support from the old is larger than the gain in support from the
young. So it is advantageous to politicians to abolish the subsidy and a
partial conversion of the PAYG-scheme is not politically feasible. Second, if
m is chosen at a sufficiently high level so that both taxes and savings change in
a very gradual way, the effect on the lifetime utilities of the currently living
generations is such that a (partial) transition to funded pensions initially
increases the value of the political target function and therefore is politically
feasible. So, for the specific values of the parameters chosen, the subsidy
on savings should be highly non-linear in order to make a conversion of the
method of financing pensions politically feasible. More general, the following
proposition15 shows that there always exists a subsidy scheme such that a
partial transition from PAYG to funded pensions is politically feasible.
15For proof of this proposition see Appendix C.
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Proposition 1 For every tuple of exogenous parameters (r, n, β, λ, τ ) there
exists a coefficient m < ∞ such that a transition to a more funded pension







> 0 and ∂m
∂τ
> 0.
Figure 3 also shows that if at some initial point in time the government
does not abolish the IST future governments will not have an incentive to
change the IST either. This can be seen as follows. Under a transition
savings rise, i.e. a movement to the right on the horizontal axis occurs. But,
for every point on the horizontal axis, it holds that for a given high value of
m the values of the government’s objective function is higher than without
a subsidy as can be seen from inspection of the figure.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyzed the effects of domestic ageing in a positive general
equilibrium model of a small open economy. More precisely, we compared
economies which have the same steady state and are hit by the same ageing
shock but have different subsidy schemes for savings. Our main conclusion
is that, in case of ageing in a small open economy with a PAYG system,
the existence and the form of the institutional savings treatment is crucial
for the political feasibility of a transition to a more savings based pension
system, which is favourable for future generations. In particular we show that
without a subsidy on savings the economy is trapped at the existing level of
savings. We also prove, however, that for any economy a non-linear subsidy
scheme exists which enables a transition to a new steady state where the tax
rate is the same as in the original steady state, but where individual savings
are higher. So, it is possible to get the desired result, but it needs a lot
of ‘fine-tuning’. This demonstrates that the political-economy of conversion
policies is not such a straightforward matter as some economists suggest.
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Appendix
The Appendix contains three sections. The first section is devoted to an
overview of the economic relations of the small open economy considered.
The second part describes the method of comparative dynamics, while the
last section proves Proposition 1.
A Overview of the (per capita) economic relations
To study the short-run as well as the long-run effects of a change in the
population growth rate through a change in the state variables s and τ on
the other variables of the model we introduce the following expressions16.







, 1) = f(kt), f
′ > 0, f ′′ < 0. (A.1)
Equilibrium on the factor market requires that f ′(kt) = r . Given this
expression the per capita wage rate (or first-period endowment) is given by
w = yt − rkt. The per capita net PAYG benefit is given by ηt = ∆t +
ξ(τ t)rst−1 = (1 + nt)wτ t . The per capita investment is given by it =
It
Nt


























Given the above expressions, the deviations of these variables from their
steady state values due to a marginal change in the population growth rate
is given by the following expressions







































































































This appendix describes the method of comparative dynamics. Let ht de-
scribe the time pattern of the peturbation of the steady state value of the
population growth rate n and π the magnitude of the shock. As mentioned in
section 4.1 we can write nt = n+πht, t = 0, 1, . . . . The effects of a marginal
decrease or increase in n can be traced by differentiation of the intertempo-
ral allocation equation (2) and the first-order-condition for the tax rate (5)
subject to the single-period budget constraints with respect to π around the
steady state. This differentiation yields the following linear system in the

















 , t = 0, 1, . . . (B.1)





















and Q is a matrix describing the effects of the current and next-period


















This system comprises one predetermined or backward looking variable
(s) and one jump or forward looking variable (τ). The eigenvalues of the










Ψ = (1 + r)ξ′(τ)βrcy + (2 + r + n)λβw,
Ω = 2λβ((1 + n)w − ξ′(τ)βrcy).
For the case where a subsidy on savings exists some tedious algebra shows
that one of the eigenvalues lies inside while the other lies outside the unit
circle.17 So the system is saddlepoint stable and can be solved to find the


























17Without a subsidy on savings the eigenvalues given by (B.4) boil down to respectively
ε1 = 1 and ε2 =
1+r
1+n . So the system is not saddlepoint stable and the steady state can be
characterized as a non-hyperbolic fixed point.
18In the following expression ε1 denotes the eigenvalue inside the unit circle and ε2
denotes the one outside the unit circle.
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where jij and qij (i, j = 1, 2) denote elements of J and Q. To distinguish


































Using the facts that ∂s−1
∂π








the once-and-for-all decrease in n is unexpected i.e. h0 = h1 = · · · = h = −1,













The evolution of both s and τ can then be derived from the system
equations. Given the evolution of these state variables we can calculate the
time paths of the variables such as young- and old-age consumption, lifetime
utility, the net PAYG benefit, the per capita investment, net export, the
current and capital account balance levels and the per capita debt according
to the relations given in part A of this Appendix.
C Proof of proposition 1
The roots of the saddlepoint stable system (B.1) can be written as a param-
eterized functions δ, ρ of m for large but countable m, i.e.
ε1 = 1− δ(m; r, n, β, λ, τ), ε2 =
1 + r
1 + n
+ ρ(m; r, n, β, λ, τ ). (C.1)
The roots given in (C.1) can be derived from (B.4) by straightforward
but tedious algebra. Given dynamic efficiency, β > 0, λ > 0 and τ ∈ (0, 1),





f(m; r, n, β, λ, τ ) = 0. (C.2)
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Given (C.1) the initial jump in τ given by (B.7) can be written as a























can be derived from substituting ∂τ0
∂π
(m, δ, ρ)







function (3) can be written as W (m, δ(m), ρ(m)). Given the parameters



















(m =∞, δ = 0, ρ = 0), 0,
∂τ1
∂π
(m =∞, δ = 0, ρ = 0)
)
,
which completes the proof
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